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lition bad standing to pursue a judicial 
review action under the common law 
or MESA. The court first examined 
the circuit court's holding that there 
could be no judicial review of the per-
mits under section 9-263. Id. at 606, 
612 A.2d at 246. The trial judge rea-
soned that the issuance of permits did 
not qualify as an "order" under section 
9-263. Id.at603,612A2dat244. The 
court of appeals noted, however, that 
the refuse disposal permit was issued 
pursuant to a decision by the Depart-
ment of the Environment. Id. at 607, 
612A2dat246. Theydeterminedthat 
this decision was synonymous with an 
"order," and was subject to judicial 
review under section 9-263 of the En-
vironment Article. Id. 
The court next turned to the issue of 
whether the permits were "contested 
cases," and therefore also subject to 
judicial review under the AP A. The 
State Government Article, section 10-
201 (c), Maryland Code Annotated, de-
fines a contested case as "a proceeding 
. . . that is required by law to be 
determined only after an opportunity 
for an agency hearing." Id. The court 
found that the State requires a hearing 
prior to the approval of a construction 
penn it. Id. at 609, 612 A.2d at 247 
(citing Sugarloaf v. Waste Disposal, 
323 Md. 641, 656-57, 594 A.2d 1115, 
1122 ( 1991 ». Thus, the court held that 
the hearings held prior to the issuance 
of the permits fell within the definition 
ofacontestedcaseundertheAPA Id. 
The court recognized that although 
the permits themselves were subject to 
judicial review under both section 9-
263 and the AP A, the Coalition had to 
meet standing requirements in order to 
challenge the issuance ofthe permits. 
Id. at 611, 612 A.2dat248. Thecourt 
stated that in order for an organization 
to have standing, it must have a "prop-
erty interest of its own. . . separate and 
distinct from that of its individual mem-
bers." Id. at 612-13,612 A.2d at 249 
(quoting Citizens Planning and Hous-
ing Ass 'n v. County Executive, 273 
Md. 333, 345,329 A.2d 681, 687-88 
(1974». The Coalition failed to show 
tbat it possessed a separate and distinct 
property interest. Id. at 614, 612 A2d 
at 250. 10 addition, because it brought 
an action to remedy a ''public wrong," 
the court found that the Coalition failed 
to show it had suffered "damage from 
such wrong differing in character and 
kind from that suffered by the general 
public." Id. at 612-13, 612 A2dat 249 
(citing Rogers v. Maryland-National 
Capital Park and Planning Comm 'n, 
253 Md 687, 691,253 A2d 713, 715 
(1969». The court of appeals thus held 
tbat the Coalition lacked standing un-
der Maryland common law to bring an 
action for judicial review. Id. at 614, 
612 A2d at 250. 
The court of appeals next deter-
mined whether the Coalition bad stand-
ingunderMESA lei. at617,612A2d 
at 252. MESA changed the Maryland 
common law requirements for stand-
ing in certain environmental proceed-
ings. Section 1-503(a)(3) relaxed the 
standing requirements for an organiza-
tion regardless of whether or not it had 
suffered a property damage which was 
independent of its individual mem-
bers. In addition, the organization did 
not need to show that it suffered a harm 
which differed from that of the general 
public. Id. at615, 612 A2dat2S0-Sl. 
The court noted that the relaxed 
standing requirements of MESA ap-
plied specifically to actions for "man-
damus or equitable relief ..• against 
any officer or agency of the State ... 
for failure . . . to perform a 
nondiscretionary ministerial duty im-
posed upon them ... or for failure to 
enforce an applicable environmental 
quality standard." Id. at 615-16 (quot-
ing MESA, Md. Nat. Res. Code Ann. 
§ 1-503(b) (1989». The court also 
determined that MESA did not grant 
relief to a party if the aggrieved activity 
complied with a current, lawful permit 
"issued by an agency of the United 
States, [or] the State." Id. at 617, 612 
A.2d at 251. Because this case in-
volvedjudicial review of the issuance 
of two pennits which did not fall 
within the express provisions ofMESA, 
the Coalition was not granted stand-
ing. The court held that MESA did not 
broaden standing requirements gener-
ally, but' only relaxed standing require-
ments for specific provisions. Id. at 
618, 612 A.2d at 252. The court em-
phasized that MESA does not "grant 
organizations . . . standing to partici-
pate in judicial review of an adminis-
trative decision." Id. at 622, 612 A.2d 
at 254. 
Medical Waste Associates is sig-
nificant because the Court of Appeals 
ofMaryland interpretedMESAstrictly. 
The court reviewed the legislative his-
tory of MESA, and held that the intent 
of the General Assembly was to relax 
the standing requirements only forspe-
cific actions. In all other cases, an 
organization must invoke standing 
under either Maryland common law or 
another statute. This decision may 
have a serious impact on Maryland 
environmental issues. If an environ-
mental organization does not meet the 
AP A requirements for standing, and 
does not fall within the narrow limits 
of MESA, the group may not bring an 
action for judicial review of permits 
issued by the Department of the Envi-
ronment. 
- Bonnie S. Laakso 
Reddick v. Stllte: SENTENCING 
JUDGE'S OFFER TO SUSPEND 
FIVE YEARS IMPRISONMENT 
UPON PAYMENT OF RESTITU-
TION TO VICTIM'S FAMILY 
VIOLATED INDIGENT 
DEFENDANT'S EQUAL PRO-
TECTION RIGHTS. 
In Reddick v. State, 327 Md. 270, 
608 A.2d 1246 (1992), the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland held that a sen-
tencingjudge's offerto suspend part of 
an indigent defendant's sentence upon 
payment of the victim's medical and 
funeral expenses was illegal because it 
violated the defendant's rights to equal 
protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution. The court's holding effec-
tively limits the power of judges to 
encourage payment of restitution when 
imposing criminal sentences. 
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A jury in the Circuit Court for Bal-
timore City convicted Raymond 
Frances Reddick ("Reddick") and 
Harvey Lee Southall of second degree 
murder and the unlawful use of a hand-
gun. Although the sentencing guide-
lines suggested a twenty-five year sen-
tence, Judge Hammerman imposed a 
thirty year sentence for the second de-
gree murder conviction and ten years 
for the handgun violation, to be served 
concurrently. The Judge believed that 
the sentence was justified in light of 
the degree of violence of the crime and 
the devastating impact the defendants' 
actions had on the victim's family. In 
addition, Judge Hammerman was con-
cerned about the fmancial burden the 
defendants' actions had placed upon 
the victim's family. Medical and fu-
neral expenses amounted to $6,000. In 
light of this burden, the Judge offered 
each defendant the opportunity to re-
duce his sentence to twenty-five years 
upon payment of $3,000 individually 
to the victim's mother by February 2, 
1991. 
On appeal to the Court of Special 
Appeals ofMaryland, both defendants' 
convictions were affirmed in an unre-
ported opinion. The Court of Appeals 
of Maryland granted Reddick's peti-
tion for certiorari. Reddick contended 
that because he is indigent, the offer to 
reduce his sentence upon making a 
contribution toward the expenses 
placed upon the family of the victim 
was unconstitutional. He asserted that 
this offer constituted an unlawful dis-
tinction among sentences based on a 
defendant's wealth or poverty, and 
therefore violated the Equal Protection 
Clause ofthe Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution and 
Article 24 ofthe Maryland Declaration 
of Rights. To further illustrate his 
position, Reddick argued that it was 
''unconstitutional to incarcerate an in-
digent defendant fora term longer than 
that imposed on a similarly situated 
nonindigent defendant who would be 
able to make the requisite monetary 
payment." Reddick, 327 Md., at 272, 
608 A.2d at 1248. Accordingly, 
Reddick requested that the court va-
cate his entire sentence because of the 
unconstitutional conditional offer to 
suspend five years of his sentence ifhe 
paid the victim's family $3,000. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
rejected the State's characterization of 
the sentence as an unconditional thirty 
year term containing a provision of 
certain conduct, compliance with which 
the defendant would encourage the trial 
judge to modify the sentence. Id. at 
273,608 A.2d at 1248. The court also 
refused to accept the State's alternative 
argument that the trial judge should 
simply strike the illegal language con-
taining the offer and allow the thirty 
year sentence to stand because pennit-
ting suspension of five years of the 
sentence conditioned upon payment of 
the victim's medical and funeral ex-
penses was illegal and, thus, null and 
void. Id. 
Although the court of appeals agreed 
with Reddick's assertion that the offer 
constituted a violation of his rights, the 
court refused to vacate his entire sen-
tence. Id. at 274, 608 A.2d at 1248. 
Instead, the court simply struck the 
illegal portion ofthe sentence and re-
manded the case to the Circuit Court 
for Baltimore City with instructions to 
resentence Reddickto a tenn of twenty-
five years. Id. In holding that Judge 
Hammerman's offer to suspend part of 
the sentence in return for contribution 
to the victim's family's expenses was 
unconstitutional, the court stated that 
where a court has "detennined that a 
fine or restitution is an appropriate 
sentence, a court cannot then imprison 
a defendant solely because of his in-
ability to pay it." Reddick, 327 Md. at 
273-74, 608 A.2d at 1248 (citing 
Beardenv. Georgia,461 U.S. 660,665 
(1983». Applying this principle of 
equal protection to the present case, the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland charac-
terized Judge Hammerman's offer as a 
chance to "buy" a suspended sentence. 
Reddick v. State, 327 Md. at 273, 608 
A.2d at 1248. The court concluded 
that equal protection required that the 
unconstitutional portion be stricken 
from the sentence; otherwise, it would 
imprison Reddick for a longer term 
thana similarly situated defendant with 
the financial capability to make the 
payment. Id. at 274, 608 A.2dat 1248. 
The court's holding effectively re-
stricts the ability of the sentencing 
judge to allow an indigent defendant 
the opportunity to pay restitution for 
his victim's expenses in order to re-
duce the term of incarceration. Where 
the defendant's actions place heavy 
financial burdens on a victim or his 
family, the court has an interest in 
seeing that the defendant take as much 
responsibility as possible for those ex-
penses. However, an offer ofa reduced 
sentence in exchange for contribution 
towards a victim's family's financial 
burden will run afoul of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment where the judge is faced 
with an indigent defendant. Thus, 
despite a court's concern over expenses 
imposed upon a victim's family, the 
court cannot offer a defendant the op-
portunity to pay restitution to his vic-
tims at the expense of the defendant's 
constitutional rights. 
- Paula L. Davis 
Two Pesos, Inc. v. TileD Cabana, Inc.: 
PROTECTION OF INHERENTLY 
DISTINCTIVE TRADE DRESS 
UNDER LANHAM ACT DOES 
NOT REQUIRE PROOF OF SEC-
ONDARY MEANING. 
In Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, 
Inc., 112 S. Ct. 2753 (1992), the United 
States Supreme Court allowed protec-
tion of a restaurant's inherently dis-
tinctive trade dress under section 43(a) 
of the Trademark: Act of 1946, 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (''Lanham 
Act"), which provides protection to 
businesses that are harmed by other 
businesses using false representation 
or description in connection with any 
goods or services. Atfrrming the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court re-
jected the assertion that secondary 
meaning of the trade dress was a requi-
site element of its protection under the 
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